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This research uses a Simetar simulation technique to evaluate the effect of the adoption of 
the Price Loss Coverage program included in the 2014 Agricultural Act on Louisiana’s rice 
equitable rental arrangement choices. Two scenarios are examined: one in which prices of the 
last three years are detrended and a second one in which they are not detrended. Each scenario 
includes six rental arrangements (Cash rent, Fixed Price, Fixed Yield, 60/40, 70/30, 80/20) and 
each rental arrangement has four adjustments (base, price trigger, yield trigger, and price and 
yield trigger). Three different risk measure analysis were conducted: Mean-Variance, Value at 
Risk (VaR), and Stochastic Efficiency with respect to a Function (SERF) to measure and analyze 
the risk associated with each option. In addition to that, the study reviews some provisions of the 
newly adopted Farm Bill (PLC and ARC-Parish). 
The Mean-Variance results show that for the tenant the 80/20 share with yield-price 
trigger (6D), the 70/30 share yield-price trigger (5D), and the 60/40 share with yield-price trigger 
(4D), dominate all the other Louisiana rice rental arrangements. For the landlord, the Fixed 
Dollar Base (1A), Fixed Price Base (2A), Fixed Yield Base (3A), dominate all the other 
Louisiana rice rental arrangements. 
The VaR results show that for the tenant the 80/20 share with yield-price trigger (6D) 
dominates all the other Louisiana rice rental arrangements, and for the landlord the Fixed Dollar 
Base (1A), Fixed Dollar with yield trigger (1B), Fixed Price Base (2A), and Fixed Price with 
yield trigger (2B) dominate all the other Louisiana rice rental arrangements. 
Finally, the SERF results show that the tenant best choices are the 80/20 share with any 
trigger option   (6A, 6B, 6C, 6D), and the landlord best choices are the Fixed Yield or Fixed 
Price with any trigger option (2A, 2B, 2C, 2D,3A, 3B, 3C, 3D)
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Introduction 
After more than two years of political gridlock between Republican and Democrat 
lawmakers, the U.S. Farm Bill, titled the Agricultural Act of 2014, was passed by the U.S. House 
of Representatives and the Senate on January 29 and February 4, 2014 and was signed into law 
by the President on February 7, 2014.  The U.S. Farm Bill is an omnibus, comprehensive 
legislative act which authorizes and regulates a variety of programs administered by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.  Authorizing specific federal agricultural programs for a four-year 
period, the 2014 Farm Bill includes legislation related to commodity price and income support 
programs, as well as programs concerning rural development, foreign agricultural trade, 
agricultural research, conservation, renewable energy, forestry, and nutrition.  One of the most 
important changes introduced in this new farm bill is that the commodity safety net focus has 
shifted from sole reliance on traditional price and revenue support programs to new program 
options which provide supplemental income support and place greater importance on producers 
having crop insurance as an independent base level of farm income support.  Program changes in 
the 2014 Farm Bill will impact all commodities currently covered by federal farm programs but 
will have a significant impact on the operating finances of rice farming operations, as rice has 
historically had significantly higher farm income support payments on a per acre basis in recent 
farm bills compared to other covered commodities.  Under the 2014 farm bill, fixed program 
payments which existed under previous farm bills will be eliminated and replaced with more 
price sensitive program payment options. 
Among the commodities likely to be affected by the provision of this bill is rice whose 
production is an important part of the agricultural sector in Louisiana.  Louisiana has 
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traditionally been the third-ranked rice producing state in the U.S., both in terms of acres 
harvested and quantity of rough rice production.  In 2013, there were 2.468 million acres of rice 
harvested in the U.S. (USDA, 2014).  Arkansas harvested 1.07 million acres of rice, primarily 
long grain rice, followed by California with 561,000 harvested acres, primarily short and 
medium grain rice.  Louisiana was ranked third with 413,000 harvested acres, most of which was 
long grain rice with minor acreages of medium grain and specialty rice.  Total rough rice 
production in Louisiana in 2013 was 30.135 million hundredweights, representing 16% of total 
U.S. rough rice production.  The estimated total value of the 2013 Louisiana rice crop was 
calculated to be $659 million (LSU AgCenter). 
In the United States, the portion of the farm bill which is of most interest to agricultural 
commodity producers and commodity organizations is Title 1.  Title 1 has historically contained 
the provisions for crop price and income support programs for many major row crops produced 
in this country.  Farm bills are usually passed with a period length of four to five years.  The first 
farm bill, The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (P.L.73-10) was passed during the Great 
Depression to control the supply of certain agricultural commodities in order to stop the sharp 
decrease of their prices which was occurring at that time.  This farm bill provided for the first 
implementation of commodity loan rates, which effectively served as price floors in an effort to 
support and stabilize farm income.  Loan rates serve the role as being a minimum price for 
specified commodities.  If the market price of a commodity would decrease below the specified 
loan rate value, the U.S. government would purchase that commodity at the loan rate value.  This 
type of agricultural income support mechanism has remained as part of succeeding farm bill 
through the present, although the particular operation of the loan rate program has varied 
somewhat over time.   
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Since 1973, many other agricultural programs have been added to the farm bill, including 
nutrition, conservation, international trade and research, in addition to an expansion of 
agricultural commodity income support programs above specified loan rate levels.  In the 1970s, 
the target price concept for supporting commodity income was introduced into farm bills and has 
remains a component of farm income support provisions in farm bills ever since.  Target prices 
for commodities covered in farm bills were established as price support levels which would 
cover total costs of production.  Through the years in an effort to restrict and stabilize farm 
program expenditures, price income support payments based on farm bill target prices have been 
paid on established crop base acres, not actual planted acres, and on established crop program 
yield, not actual yield.  The target price program generally works by paying a payment rate based 
on the difference between the established target price and market price for a program 
commodity, when the market price is below the target price.  This payment rate is paid on 
established program yield and some percentage of established base acres.  Once established 
initially, crop base acres and program yields have generally not changed over time. 
Since the mid-1970s and similar to other program commodities, the target price and loan 
rate programs have been the primary means of supporting commodity income associated with 
rice production.  Target price provisions for rice were first enacted by the Rice Production Act of 
1975 which established target support prices of $8.25 per cwt. for rice produced in the 1976 and 
1977 crop years.  The loan rate for rice at that time was set at $6.19 per cwt.  Overtime, 
succeeding farm bills increased the target price levels for covered commodities.  The Food, 
Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-624) established a rice program 
target price and loan rate of $10.71 per cwt. and $6.50 per cwt. for the 1990-1995 crop years. 
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During the mid-1990s, commodity prices and farm income was at high levels.  Given 
these conditions, there was growing interest in Congress that the federal government should get 
out of the farm income support business.  In response, The Federal Agricultural Improvement 
and Reform Act of 1996 (P.L.104-127) was enacted. It was commonly called the “Freedom to 
Farm Bill” or the FAIR Act.  The basic foundation of this farm bill was to create a series of fixed 
declining support payments which would have the effect of gradually reducing the involvement 
of the federal government in agricultural commodity markets.  The law created for the first time 
a “decoupled” subsidy called the Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) for selected agricultural 
commodities.  “Decoupled” means that the payments are independent of price and revenues.  
Farmers were also free to plant any crop, with the exception of certain fruits and vegetables, as 
the intent of the farm bill was to allow producers to respond to market signals.  The fixed 
program payments established under the 1996 Farm Bill have remained in succeeding farm bills, 
in one form or another, and were the basis for the fixed Direct Payment Program which has been 
part of the 2002 and 2008 Farms Bills. 
In 2002, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-171) was passed.  
This bill contained two commodity income support programs:  The Direct Payment Program and 
the Countercyclical Payment Program.  Both of these programs continued to utilize established 
target prices and loans rates to determine program payments.  For rice the target price was set at 
$10.50 per cwt.  The Direct Payment Program established a fixed payment rate of $2.35 per cwt. 
for rice paid established rice program yields and on 85% of rice base acres.  In the 
Countercyclical Payment Program, program payments were a function of market prices.  
Subtracting the direct payment of $2.35 per cwt. from the target price of $10.50 per cwt. yielded 
a maximum price support level of $8.15 per cwt. under the Countercyclical Program.  If rough 
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rice market prices fell below $8.15 per cwt., growers would receive a payment based on that 
price difference, again paid on program yields and percentage of base acres.  The 2008 Farm 
Bill, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246) essentially continued these 
two farm income support programs, while also creating another option called the Average Crop 
Revenue Election (ACRE) program which developed farm income support payments based on 
whole farm revenues.   
With the passage of the Agricultural Act of 2014, both the Direct and Countercyclical 
Payment Programs have been repealed.  This means the elimination of fixed direct program 
payments which agricultural producers of covered commodities have been receiving since 2002 
regardless of the commodity market price levels.  More specifically for rice production in 
Louisiana, the repeal of the Direct Payment Program will mean a loss of approximately $90 to 
$95 per rice base acre in guaranteed income to rice farming operations.  This will have a 
significant impact on several facets of rice production business operations including acquisition 
of crop operating loans from financial institutions and equitable rental arrangements with land 
owners. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
With the passage of the new farm bill in 2014 and the elimination of fixed direct 
payments to rice farming operations, the expected financial performance of rice production in 
Louisiana will certainly be altered.  Direct payments to rice farms, whose value has been 
capitalized into land values and rental rates over time, no longer exist.  A central question being 
asked by both rice tenant producers and rice land owners is: How will the loss of direct program 
payments impact the financial performance of rice production in Louisiana and how should 
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equitable rice rental arrangements, both cash and share arrangements, adjust to reflect this 
change in expected farm program income support. 
1.3 Review of Literature 
This section reviews some of the references that deal with the three tangent issues that 
make up the topic of this research project.  The first section reviews the relevant provisions of 
Title I of the Agricultural Act of 2014 regarding farm income support programs available to rice 
producers.  The second section reviews previous literature regarding establishment of equitable 
agricultural rental arrangements.  The third section reviews relevant literature concerning 
stochastic simulation risk analysis of agricultural decision problems. 
The first source of information about the 2014 Farm Bill that comes to mind is the House 
of Representative’s Conference Report but it is a very long and cumbersome document. Instead, 
Schnitkey et al. (2014), Smith (2014), and Johnson and Monke’s provide more concise and 
meaningful accounts of the last Farm Bills. The last authors issued on April 7, 2014 a very brief 
summary of the bill’s twelve titles as well as their cost for the duration of the bill: 2014-18. 
Salassi (2014) presents a useful comparison between the PLC and ARC-County for Acadia rice 
growers. Zulauf and Schnitkey compared and contrasted PLC and ARC-County on one hand and 
DCP and ACRE on the other hand (Farmdoc, March 18, 2014). In a previous article in the same 
journal, the two authors examined the issue of PLC and ARC-County decision for U.S. corn 
based on “projected ARC implied price” and PLC’s reference price. This corn case focuses on 
“the price path” estimation as a crucial factor in the program decision process.  
The second issue of interest to this research is about rental arrangements and their 
fairness. In agriculture, there are three major types of rent arrangement: cash rent, share rent and 
flexible rent. According to Parsell and Hansen the most common share rentals are 1/2-1/2, 2/3-
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1/3, or 3/4-1/4, the first fraction being the tenant’s share. Salassi and Deliberto 2008 LSU 
AgCenter Staff Report: Examining Cropland Production in Louisiana’s provides among other 
important things some useful data about Louisiana’s rice land tenure statistics. The 2008 study 
surveyed 158 rice farmers in 487 land tracts. Among these tracts there were 100 cash rents, 350 
share rents, and the rest were not identified. Of the share renting respondents 18 were 16% share, 
105 were 20% share, 27 were 25% share, 17 were 33% share, 58 were 40% share, and 17 were 
50% share. The survey results show that when the share is 30% or more, the landowner paid 
more than 70% of the irrigation costs. This survey were not  concerned with the number of  
farms owned exclusively, but Aldana in his 2005 thesis reported that in Southwestern Louisiana, 
18% rice farms were owned and 82% were leased ( Aldana, 2005). In 2014, Salassi and 
Deliberto developed a useful Excel spreadsheet that owners and tenants can use to calculate their 
rice rental arrangement net return. This aid will be used extensively in this study. Finally, a great 
consensus seem to exist among scholars in the agricultural field that an equitable share rental 
arrangement requires that the revenue should be shared between the rental contracting  parties in 
the same proportions of their contribution to the production inputs.(Salassi and Deliberto,2014; 
Bechtel and Corp; Parcell and Hansen).  
The third sub-topic of this study is about stochastic simulation and risk management. In 
2000, Richardson et al. wrote an article in the Journal of Agricultural Economics and Applied 
Economics about the estimation of the parameters of a multivariate empirical probability 
distribution that preserves the inter and intra-correlation between its input variables and 
consequently avoiding the bias that may exist had not such a procedure been applied. The 
authors also created an Excel spreadsheet that can be used to simulate observations with the 
property mentioned above. For risk analysis, a method called Stochastic Efficiency with Respect 
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to a Function (SERF) introduced in 2004 by Hardaker et al. will be used in this study. In 2011, 
Richardson et al. developed an Excel add-in called Simulation & Econometrics to Analyze Risk 
(SIMETAR) that can be used SERF analysis. Details about SERF, SIMETAR, and MVE will be 
provided in the next sections.  
1.4 Objectives 
The general objective of this research is to investigate potential changes in equitable rice 
rental arrangements expected in reaction to the passage of new farm program income support 
provisions of the Agricultural Act of 2014 and to evaluate the potential impacts on grower net 
returns and income risk. 
The specific objectives are: 
1) Review the provisions of the 2014 Agricultural Act and identify changes in the 
commodity program provisions relative to rice income support. 
2) Review previous literature in the discipline regarding the definition and establishments of 
equitable rents associated with agricultural crop production. 
3) Define common rice rental arrangements currently used in rice production in Louisiana 
and specify alternative rental arrangements to evaluate. 
4) Develop stochastic models to evaluate the impact of alternative rental arrangements on 
the expected net income of rice growers. 
5) Identify preferred rental arrangements for rice producers over a range of risk preferences. 
1.5 Methodology  
  Objective 1 of this study will involve a detailed review of the newly passed farm bill to 
identify provisions which are applicable to rice producers.  An overview of the new farm bill is 
presented here.  The Agricultural Act of 2014 was signed into law by President Barack Obama in 
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February 2014. This new farm bill contains twelve titles which specify the provisions of the 
various programs included in the farm bill.  Provisions related to commodity price and income 
support measures are included in Title I. The commodities covered included in the programs 
outlined in Title I are: barley, corn, dry peas, grain sorghum, large chickpeas, small chickpeas, 
lentils, long grain rice, medium grain rice, oats, other oilseeds, peanuts, soybeans, and wheat.  
Marketing loan provisions for cotton are included in Title I with cotton crop insurance program 
provisions included in Title XI. The duration of this farm bill will be for the 2014 to 2018 crop 
years.  Under this new farm bill, the direct payment and counter-cyclical payment programs of 
the previous farm bill were repealed and replaced with two new income support program options 
from which producers can choose on a crop by crop basis. Payment of all existing benefits 
cannot exceed $125,000 per person or $250,000 per couple engaged in substantial agricultural 
activities. (Johnson and Monke, 2014). 
The Price Loss Coverage (PLC) Program is a price safety net program and the Agriculture 
Risk Coverage / county option (ARC-County) Program and Agriculture Risk Coverage / 
individual farm option (ARC-Individual) Program are revenue based programs. Both the PLC 
and ARC-County are selected and operate on a crop by crop and farm by farm basis, but the ARC-
Individual operates by aggregating income from all commodities produced on a farm. For 
example, if a grower has two farms and on farm 1 he is planting rice and soybeans and on farm2 
he is planting corn and wheat, he can enroll in PLC Program for rice in farm 1 and corn and wheat 
in farm 2 and  enroll in ARC-County Program for only soybeans in farm 1. But if he chooses to 
enroll in ARC-Individual he has to enroll all the commodities and all the farms in that program. 
In addition, the Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) of Title XI provides for coverage of crop 
insurance deductibles on existing crop insurances policies and is available only to commodities 
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enrolled in the PLC program exclusively.  The ARC Program is considered to be a shallow loss 
coverage program, similar to SCO.  As a result, participation in SCO is not available for crops 
enrolled in the ARC Program (Smith, 2014; U.S. House of Representatives, 2014) 
Each producer must take three major decisions in order for him to be eligible for Title I 
benefits: 
- To keep existing base acres or reallocate them based on previous planting history. 
- To keep the 2008 Payment Program yield or update it to 90% of the average yields of 
the 2008-2012 years (if enrolled in the PLC Program). 
- To elect between PLC, ARC-County or ARC-Individual. This decision cannot be 
changed during the duration of the bill. (Smith, 2014; U.S. House of Representatives, 
2014) 
Reallocation of the base acres cannot exceed the number of existing base acres minus the 
cotton base acres. Cotton base acres are now transformed or categorized into “generic base acres” 
and can be allocated to alternative covered commodities on a year by year basis.  The total base 
acres continue to be “decoupled” in this bill ,which means that the commodities are not required 
to be planted, while the generic base are required to be planted.  Reallocation of the base acres is 
a landowner decision not a tenant one. (Smith, 2014; U.S. House of Representatives, 2014) 
The decision to update yield is also at the discretion of the landowner and it affects the 
PLC program only. The owner can keep the Direct and Countercyclical Programs payment or 
update to 90% of his average yield for 2008-2012 years. If in any year the yield drops below 75% 
of the county yield, the county yield will be used in the calculation of the average. In the case of 
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multiple owners a unanimous decision is required. (Smith, 2014; U.S. House of Representatives, 
2014). 
The most crucial decision is the third one: choosing between PLC, ARC-County, or ARC-
Individual.  The Price Loss Coverage (PLC) is a price support program similar in many aspects 
to the Countercyclical Payment of the 2002 Farm Bill. The program makes payments whenever 
the market year average (MYA) of the covered commodity falls below a certain reference price. 
Examples of reference price are: $3.70/Bushel for corn, $535/ton for peanut, $14.00/cwt. for rice 
and $5.50/bushel for wheat. The payment rate is the difference between the reference price and 
the higher of MYA price or loan rate (LR). The payment is equal to 85%of the payment rate times 
the payment yield times the base acres. (Smith, 2014; U.S. House of Representatives, 2014.  This 
research will focus on participation in the PLC Program, as the majority of rice base acres, in 
Louisiana as well as in other rice producing states, is expected to be enrolled in the PLC Program 
for the price protection afforded by the reference prices specified in that program. 
Under objective 2 of this study, previous literature regarding the definition and 
establishment of equitable crop land rental arrangements will be reviewed.  Land is a major factor 
in the agricultural production. It can be owned or rented. Crop rental arrangements usually take 
three forms: cash, crop share, or a combination of both. In addition to that, crop share arrangements 
can be fixed or flexible. The decision to choose between these two kinds of rental leases involves 
a tradeoff between income and risk. The crop share option shifts some of output price, yield, and 
production risks from the tenant to the landowner, but it means also more potential income for the 
landowner. 
Under objective 3, common crop land rental arrangements associated with rice production 
in the state will be specified for evaluation and analysis.  More specifically, these rice rental 
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arrangements will be evaluated under participation in the PLC program to estimate comparable 
grower and landlord net returns under each rental agreement.  These crop leases need to be 
equitable to the lessor and lessee. This means that each party should receive a portion of the crop 
that is proportional to its contribution to the production of the output. For that purpose, in 2013 the 
LSU AgCenter developed a decision tool called the Rice Rental Arrangement Net Return 
Evaluation Model intended to help Louisiana farmers “in evaluating alternative rice rental 
arrangements and to estimate the impact on expected net returns above specified rice production 
expenses for both the tenants rice producer and the land owner.”  In 2014, the model was modified 
to include the newly adopted PLC payment that is likely to be chosen by the farmers of this region. 
This Excel spreadsheet can be obtained from the LSU Agcenter website at www.lsuagcenter.com. 
(Salassi and Deliberto, 2014). 
Under objective 4, stochastic models will be developed to estimate distributions of grower 
net returns above variable production with participation in the PLC Program under alternative 
rental arrangements.  The general form of the net return equation utilized in the analysis can be 
specified as follows: 
NR = (P*YD*GR) + (GP*PGYD*PLTRatio) - ∑ (IPrice*IQty) 
where NR = net returns per planted acre, P = commodity market price, YD = crop yield per acre, 
GR = grower share of crop proceeds, GP = government farm program payment rate, PGYD = farm 
program yield, PLTRatio = the ration of paid base acres to planted acres, IPrice = production input 
price, and IQty = production input quantity.  Monte carlo simulation will be used to develop 
distributions of net returns under alternative rental arrangements.  The Simetar simulation softward 
will be utilized to generate random values of specified random variables.  This software package, 
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based on simulation procedures developed by Richardson et al. (2000), provides the ability to 
generate random values which are inter- and intra-correlated over time and across variables. 
 Under objective 5, distributions of grower net returns will be evaluated to identify the 
impact of the PLC program on preferred rice crop rental arrangements over a range of risk 
preferences.  The theoretical basis of this analysis will be the Subjective Expected Utility 
hypothesis which states that the utility of a risky alternative is the decision maker’s expected utility 
for the alternative, i.e., a probability-weighted average of outcome utilities (Hardaker, et al., 2004).  
As a result, the decision maker’s utility function for decision alternative outcomes is required. 
A negative exponential utility function, commonly used in the field of agricultural 
economics to represent a decision maker’s utility for wealth related to risky choices, will be utilized 
(Schumann, et al., 2004).  Calculation of the certainty equivalents and comparison over alternative 
risky crop rental arrangement alternatives will be conducted using an Excel based approach 
developed by (Hardaker, et al., 2004).  Distributions of net returns evaluated under this study 
objective will be those estimated under objective 4.  
The certainty equivalent (CE) of a risky choice is an estimated value at which the decision 
maker would be indifferent between the estimated certainty equivalent and the risky choice.  The 
estimation of certainty equivalents are dependent upon the choice of utility function employed.  
This study will utilize a negative exponential utility function, commonly used for decision risk 
analysis choices.  A negative exponential utility function may be expressed mathematically as: 
U(w) = -exp(-ra w) 
where U represents a measure of utility from a given choice or decision, w represents the wealth 
or income associated with that choice and ra represents a specific absolute risk aversion coefficient.  
The absolute risk aversion coefficient is a means of measuring the degree of risk aversion by a 
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decision maker faced with a risky decision choice.  An absolute risk aversion coefficient is defined 
as the negative ratio of the second and first derivatives of a wealth utility function and basically 
serves as a measure of the curvature of a utility function (Anderson, et al., 1977). 
Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) will be utilized in conducting this 
analysis.  Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function was originally proposed by Hardaker and 
Lien (2003) as a means to evaluate a set of risky alternatives in terms of certainty equivalents for 
a specified range of risk preferences.  The advantage of this procedure lies in its ability to compare 
the entire set of risky alternatives available to the decision maker, rather than the pairwise 
comparisons which are made by other risk analysis procedures such as stochastic dominance with 
respect to a function (SDRF). 
Within this type of risk analysis, a problem arises regarding the appropriate values and 
range of absolute risk aversion coefficients to evaluate for a given risky decision choice.  One 
methodology to address this issue is to evaluate the relationship between absolute and relative risk 
aversion (Hardaker, et al., 2004).  This relationship may be expressed mathematically as follows: 
ra(w)= rr(w)/w 
where ra is the absolute risk aversion coefficient, rr is the relative risk aversion coefficient  and w 
is the wealth from a given risky choice.  Anderson and Dillon (1992) have proposed a general 
classification range of relative risk aversion coefficients in the range of 0.0 for no risk, 0.5 for 
very little risk, and an upper value of approximately 4.0 for very risky choices.  Absolute risk 
aversion coefficients to be utilized in this analysis will be obtained by dividing a range of relative 
risk aversion coefficients (0.0 to 4.0) by the estimated net return above variable cost per acre for 
alternative rental arrangement choices. 
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 The certainty equivalents for alternative rice rental arrangement choices and absolute risk 
aversion coefficients will then be estimated using the following relationship as outlined by 
Hardaker, et al., 2004: 











The analysis here will focus on the impact of changes in the rice provisions relative to the 
PLC Program and its impact on grower net returns.  Estimated certainty equivalent values for 
alternative rental arrangement alternatives will be plotted, with comparisons made regarding 
which specific rental arrangement choices dominate other choices.   
This risk management analysis will be compared and contrasted with two other risk 
measure analyses: Mean-Variance and Value at Risk.  Mean-Variance was developed by 
Markovitz as portfolio risk management tool early in the fifties of the last century. It is based on 
the idea that the mean is “good” and variation is “bad”.  In this kind of analysis an alternative A 
is preferred to an alternative B if it has a smaller variance (or equivalently a smaller standard 
deviation) and its mean is at most equal to the mean of alternative B. A is also preferred to B if it 
has a larger mean and its variance(or equivalently the standard deviation) is at most equal to the 
variance of B. If one alternative has a smaller variance (or equivalently a smaller standard 
deviation), but its mean is less than the other alternative mean the Mean –Variance has no 
discriminatory power. The inefficient set of alternatives is the set that contains all alternatives 
that are dominated by at least another alternative.  The efficient set is the set of all the 
alternatives that are dominated by no other alternative.   
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Another risk management, whose roots can be traced back to Mean –Variance approach, 
and is widely used by the financial institutions is the value at risk (VaR).   It was developed by J. 
P. Morgan in 1993. Philippe Jorion defined (VaR) as: 
…the worst loss over a target horizon with a given level of confidence. More formally, 
VAR describes the quantile of the projected distribution of gains and losses over the 
target horizon. If c is the selected confidence level, VAR correspond to 1-c lower tail 
level. For instance, with a 95 percent confidence level, VAR should be such that it 
exceeds 5 percent of the total number of observations in the distribution. (Jorion , 2001 
p.22)   
In Value at Risk analysis, estimated net return values for alternative decision choices are 
compared at a specific probability of occurrence level.  These comparisons are generally 
evaluated in terms of determining net return values at which the probability of incurring a net 






CHAPTER 2.  EQUITABLE RICE RENTAL ARRANGEMENT 
SPECIFICATION 
 Land is a predominant factor of production required in any production business and it is 
even more so in the agricultural sector. To produce an agricultural commodity an operator needs 
a portion of land that is securely available for the duration of the production cycle. This portion 
of land has to be either owned or leased from another source. Using the terminology of the U.S. 
Census of Agriculture, full owner is defined as an operator who owns all the land he uses. A 
tenant uses a land that is completely leased from another owner.  A part owner owns some of the 
land that is used and rent the rest from another owner. According to Barry et al.(2000), 
ownership is more common in the fruit and vegetable sector, while leasehold is more prevalent in 
the grain and cotton sector. Tenant and landowners are usually bound by a lease contract that 
stipulate their rental arrangement details.   In this chapter, rental arrangements are examined and 
specified to make them equitable to both parties.      
2.1 Definition of Equitable Crop Rental Arrangements 
Land rental arrangements associated with the production of agricultural crop 
commodities can be grouped into two basic types: cash rent and share rent.  The cash rent 
situation is where the tenant producer pays a fixed dollar amount per acre to the landlord for the 
use of the land.  In this case, the tenant producer generally pays all crop production expenses, 
although some production expenses may be shared.  The share rent situation is where the tenant 
producer pays the landlord a share (percentage) of the crop proceeds for the use of the land.  In 
this case, the landlord generally does pay a portion of some production expenses.  Both types of 
crop rental arrangements have advantages and disadvantages which may favor one type of rental 
arrangement over the other in a given situation.  The degree of price and production risk assumed 
by each party under a cash or share rental arrangement is probably one of the most important 
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criteria to be considered when negotiating a crop land lease.  Under a cash rental arrangement, 
the tenant producer pays all production costs and assumed all of the income risk associated with 
production of the crop.  Under a share rental arrangement, the tenant producer and the landlord 
share in the risk of the crop, sharing production expenses as well as crop proceeds. 
One important aspect of both cash and share crop land rental arrangements is related to 
the fairness and equity of the agreement to both parties.  For both types of rental arrangements, 
an equitable rental arrangement is one in which crop proceeds are shared in roughly the same 
proportion as total production costs are shared.  In cash rent situations, the cash rent amount paid 
per acre is a function of the productivity of the land, but there are some approaches which can be 
used to determine a fair and equitable cash rent amount.  Two approaches which are commonly 
used to determine a fair cash rent value are based on landowner costs, in which the cash rent paid 
would cover any land costs by the land owner, or crop share equivalent, in which a fixed dollar 
amount based on a crop share equivalent less some risk premium amount is used (Kay, Edwards, 
Duffy, 2004).  In addition, cash rental arrangements can also be negotiated as a flexible cash 
rent, whereby rather than the cash rent being a fixed dollar amount per acre, the rate can be 
adjusted to a different dollar per acre value based on the level of the market price or crop yield or 
the cash rent will be paid based on a fixed market price or fixed crop yield (Edwards, 2008; 
Edwards, 2013). 
An equitable crop share rental arrangement is a rental arrangement in which all costs of 
production are shared in the same or almost the same proportions as the proportions of the 
sharing of the crop proceeds from production between the landlord and the tenant. Some of the 
costs are supplied for exclusively by one of the parties and some of them are shared by the 
parties.  The shared costs may include: custom application, drying, seed, fuel, fertilizers, 
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chemicals, and custom haul. For example, in a 60-40 rental arrangement the tenant pays 60% of 
the total costs and receives 60% of the crop proceeds, and the landowner pays 40% of these total 
costs and receives 40% of the crop proceeds.  
2.2 Typical Rice Rental Arrangements in Louisiana 
Rental arrangements associated with rice production in Louisiana have historically been 
dominated by crop share arrangements, with a small portion of leases negotiated on a cash rent 
basis.  Being an irrigated crop, land owners, in addition to providing the land for rice production, 
have also traditionally provided the source of water for rice irrigation.  For rice production with 
irrigation water sources from deep wells, the land owner would generally be responsible for 
providing the well, pump and power unit required to provide irrigation water to the rice field.  In 
many cases the land owner would also pay the variable fuel costs associated with pumping the 
water onto the field.  As electric irrigation pumping systems have increased in use, rental 
arrangements have adjusted to reflect the changes in fixed and variable irrigation costs.  In 
addition, the tremendous increase in rice production costs per acre over the past several years has 
also resulted in adjustments to rental arrangements in an effort to share crop proceeds on a more 
equitable basis. 
According to Salassi and Deliberto (2008), the most common rice rental arrangements in 
Louisiana are the 80/20 rental arrangements (31.4%), the 60/40 rental arrangements (17.4%), and 
the 70/30 rental arrangements (9.6%) based on a survey of rice producers in the state. Together 
these rice rental arrangements represent almost two thirds of the arrangements of the survey 
respondents. The survey also indicated that the share of irrigation pumping costs paid by 
landowners varied over the range of crop share alternative arrangements. In the 60/40 rice rental 
arrangements, 98.3% of the survey respondents indicated that the land owner paid all irrigation 
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pumping costs.  The land owner paid all irrigation pumping costs in 71.9% of the 70/30 crop 
share rental arrangements.  However, for the 80/20 crop share arrangements, only 23.8% of the 
leases reported land owners paying irrigation pumping costs. In the 60/40 arrangement the 
survey found that on average 36.1 percent of fertilizer, 36 percent of chemicals, and 39.2 percent 
of drying were paid by the landlord but only 20.3 percent of the seed costs. This indicates that at 
least for this rice rental arrangement and for fertilizer, chemicals and drying the landlord is 
paying on average a share that is close to the 40 percent that he is supposed to pay in an equitable 
rental arrangement.  
2.3 Specification of Equitable Base Rice Rental Arrangements 
 For purposes of this analysis, six base alternative rice rental arrangements were specified.  
Three of the base arrangements were forms of cash rent and three of the arrangements were 
forms of share rent.  The three alternative cash rental arrangements were specified as follows: 
 Fixed dollar – land rent is a fixed dollar amount of $80 per acre  
 Fixed price – land rent is a fixed price of $1.20 per cwt. times the actual rice yield 
 Fixed yield – land rent is equal to the market price times a fixed yield of 6.8 cwt. per acre 
The three crop share rental arrangements evaluated in this study were specified as follows: 
 60/40 – land rent is equal to 40% of the crop proceeds  
 70/30 – land rent is equal to 30% of the crop proceeds 
 80/20 – land rent is equal to 20% of the crop proceeds 
 For the base cash rental arrangements, rental rate parameters were selected based on 
observed data for common cash rental agreements for rice production.  The fixed dollar cash 
rental rate of $80 per planted acre was chosen as a representative cash rental rate for rice land.  
The fixed price cash rate of $1.20 per cwt. was chosen to represent 10% of an expected rice 
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market price of $12.00 per cwt.  The fixed yield cash rate of 6.8 cwt. per acre was chosen to 
represent 10% of an expected rice yield of 68.4 cwt. per acre.  Under these three cash rental 
arrangement alternatives, the tenant producer would pay 100% of all variable production costs 
including irrigation pumping costs.  The tenant would also pay all fixed costs associated with 
farm machinery and equipment.  The land owner would pay 100% of all fixed costs on irrigation 
equipment as well as any property taxes on the land itself.  Under these cash rental arrangements, 
the tenant would receive 100% of crop proceeds and the land owner would only receive cash 
rental payments for providing land as specified above.  For all three base cash rental 
arrangements, a $40 per acre management charge was included to represent the cost of 
management, based on an assumed management charge approximately equal to 5% of expected 
revenue.  Production cost shares paid by tenant and land owner for the three base cash rent 
arrangements are shown in Tables 2.1 – 2.3. This study utilized 2014 estimated rice production 
costs for drill planted Clearfield rice production (Salassi, Deliberto, and Hilbun, 2014). 
For the base share rental arrangements, rental rate parameters were selected to represent 
three equitable crop share arrangements in which the tenant and land owner are sharing crop 
proceeds in a manner which closely matches the share of total production input costs provided by 
each party.  All inputs provided to the rice production enterprise were valued including both 
variable and fixed cost components.  Similar to the cash rent specifications, all three base share 
rental arrangements included a $40 per acre management charge, based on an assumed value of 
management approximately equal to 5% of expected revenue.   
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Table 2.1 – Production Cost Share, Rice First Crop, Fixed Dollar Cash Rental Arrangement 
  Total First Rice Crop Production Costs 
          Total Costs        Tenant Costs1       Landlord Costs2 







Custom fert appl 
Custom haul 
Field labor 
Fuel – field operations 
Fuel – irrigation 
Repairs – equip. 
Repairs – irrg equip. 
Interest oper. cap. 
Fixed cost – equip. 




































































































































1 Tenant pays 100% of variable costs of fertilization, chemical (herbicide and insecticide), 
hauling and drying; seed, irrigation supplies, field labor, field operation fuel and repair, and 
fixed field equipment cost, as well as 100% of variable irrigation pumping costs.  A $40 per 
acre management charge is also charged to the tenant.  Tenant also pays a fixed $80 per acre 
cash rent. 






Table 2.2 – Production Cost Share, Rice First Crop, Fixed Price Cash Rental Arrangement 
  Total First Rice Crop Production Costs 
          Total Costs        Tenant Costs1       Landlord Costs2 







Custom fert appl 
Custom haul 
Field labor 
Fuel – field operations 
Fuel – irrigation 
Repairs – equip. 
Repairs – irrg equip. 
Interest oper. cap. 
Fixed cost – equip. 




































































































































1 Tenant pays 100% of variable costs of fertilization, chemical (herbicide and insecticide), 
hauling and drying; seed, irrigation supplies, field labor, field operation fuel and repair, and 
fixed field equipment cost, as well as 100% of variable irrigation pumping costs.  A $40 per 
acre management charge is also charged to the tenant.  Tenant also pays a fixed cash rent price 
of $1.20 cwt. per acre on actual production yield. 
2 Landlord pays 100% of fixed irrigation costs and property taxes. 
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Table 2.3 – Production Cost Share, Rice First Crop, Fixed Yield Cash Rental Arrangement 
  Total First Rice Crop Production Costs 
          Total Costs        Tenant Costs1       Landlord Costs2 







Custom fert appl 
Custom haul 
Field labor 
Fuel – field operations 
Fuel – irrigation 
Repairs – equip. 
Repairs – irrg equip. 
Interest oper. cap. 
Fixed cost – equip. 




































































































































1 Tenant pays 100% of variable costs of fertilization, chemical (herbicide and insecticide), 
hauling and drying; seed, irrigation supplies, field labor, field operation fuel and repair, and 
fixed field equipment cost, as well as 100% of variable irrigation pumping costs.  A $40 per 
acre management charge is also charged to the tenant.  Tenant also pays a fixed cash rent yield 
of 6.80 cwt. per acre on actual market price received. 
2 Landlord pays 100% of fixed irrigation costs and property taxes. 
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For the 60/40 crop share rental arrangement, the tenant and land owner share crop proceeds on a 
60% (tenant) and 40% (land owner) basis.  Under this arrangement, the tenant pays 60% of rice 
first crop variable costs for fertilization, chemical (herbicide and insecticide), hauling and drying, 
100% of rice first crop variable costs for seed, irrigation supplies, field labor, field operation fuel 
and repair, and fixed field equipment cost.  The landlord pays 40% of rice first crop variable 
costs of fertilization, chemical (herbicide and insecticide), hauling and drying and 100% of 
irrigation pumping costs, fixed irrigation costs and property taxes.  Production cost shares paid 
by tenant and land owner for the base 60/40 share rent arrangement is shown in Table 2.4. 
 For the 70/30 crop share rental arrangement, the tenant and land owner share crop 
proceeds on a 70% (tenant) and 30% (land owner) basis.  Under this arrangement, the tenant 
pays 70% of rice first crop variable costs for fertilization, chemical (herbicide and insecticide), 
hauling and drying, 100% of rice first crop variable costs for seed, irrigation supplies, field labor, 
field operation fuel and repair, and fixed field equipment cost.  The landlord pays 30% of rice 
first crop variable costs of fertilization, chemical (herbicide and insecticide), hauling and drying 
and 100% of irrigation pumping costs, fixed irrigation costs and property taxes.  Production cost 
shares paid by tenant and land owner for the base 70/30 share rent arrangement is shown in 
Table 2.5. 
 For the 80/20 crop share rental arrangement, the tenant and land owner share crop 
proceeds on an 80% (tenant) and 20% (land owner) basis.  Under this arrangement, the tenant 
pays 80% of rice first crop variable costs for fertilization, chemical (herbicide and insecticide), 
hauling and drying, 100% of rice first crop variable costs for seed, irrigation supplies, field labor, 




Table 2.4 – Production Cost Share, Rice First Crop, 60/40 Crop Share Rental Arrangement 
  Total First Rice Crop Production Costs 
          Total Costs        Tenant Costs1       Landlord Costs2 







Custom fert appl 
Custom haul 
Field labor 
Fuel – field operations 
Fuel – irrigation 
Repairs – equip. 
Repairs – irrg equip. 
Interest oper. cap. 
Fixed cost – equip. 





























































































































1 Tenant pays 60% of variable costs of fertilization, chemical (herbicide and insecticide), 
hauling and drying; 100% of variable costs for seed, irrigation supplies, field labor, field 
operation fuel and repair, and fixed field equipment cost.  A $40 per acre management charge 
is also charged to the tenant. 
2 Landlord pays 40% of variable costs of fertilization, chemical (herbicide and insecticide), 





Table 2.5 – Production Cost Share, Rice First Crop, 70/30 Crop Share Rental Arrangement 
  Total First Rice Crop Production Costs 
          Total Costs        Tenant Costs1       Landlord Costs2 







Custom fert appl 
Custom haul 
Field labor 
Fuel – field operations 
Fuel – irrigation 
Repairs – equip. 
Repairs – irrg equip. 
Interest oper. cap. 
Fixed cost – equip. 





























































































































1 Tenant pays 70% of variable costs of fertilization, hauling and dryings; 100% of variable 
costs of seed, chemical (herbicide and insecticide), irrigation supplies, field labor, field 
operation fuel and repairs, and fixed field equipment cost.  A $40 per acre management charge 
is also charged to the tenant. 
2 Landlord pays 30% of variable costs of fertilization, hauling and drying; 100% of irrigation 




The landlord pays 20% of rice first crop variable costs of fertilization, chemical 
(herbicide and insecticide), hauling and drying and 100% of irrigation pumping co Production 
cost shares paid by tenant and land owner for the base 80/20 share rent arrangement is shown in 
Table 2.6. 
sts, fixed irrigation costs and property taxes.   
Over the past few years, approximately 38% of the rice acreage in Acadia Parish, 
Louisiana has been kept in production for a ratoon or second crop.  Accordingly, ratoon crop 
production was included in the analysis on prorated share of 38% for both yield and production 
cost.  For cash rental arrangements, the tenant was specified to pay 100% of all ratoon crop 
variable production cost.  For crop share rental arrangements, variable costs associated with 
ratoon crop production were split as specified above for the first crop, with the exception of 
variable irrigation pumping costs.  In order to maintain equitability in the specified share rental 
arrangements, it was required for the tenant to pay a portion of the ratoon crop variable irrigation 
cost.  As a result, the portion of variable irrigation pumping cost paid by the tenant for the 60/40, 
70/30 and 80/20 crop share arrangements was specified as 10%, 35%, and 55%, respectively.  
Production cost shares paid by the tenant and land owner for ratoon crop production for the six 
base rental arrangements are shown in Tables 2.7 - 2.12. 
2.4 Specification of Flexible Adjustments to Base Rice Rental Arrangements 
 Flexible cash or share crop rental arrangements represent a commonly utilized approach 
to reduce the probability of negative net returns to the tenant producer in years of low crop yields 
and/or low market prices.  It is more commonly used in association with cash rents, as cash rents 
are fixed by definition.  For this study, flexible adjustments to the base specified rental rates for 
rice production were evaluated for each of the six base cash and share rental arrangements.  
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Table 2.6 – Production Cost Share, Rice First Crop, 80/20 Crop Share Rental Arrangement 
  Total First Rice Crop Production Costs 
          Total Costs        Tenant Costs1       Landlord Costs2 







Custom fert appl 
Custom haul 
Field labor 
Fuel – field operations 
Fuel – irrigation 
Repairs – equip. 
Repairs – irrg equip. 
Interest oper. cap. 
Fixed cost – equip. 





























































































































1 Tenant pays 100% of variable costs of fertilization, chemical (herbicide and insecticide), 
hauling, drying, seed, irrigation supplies, field labor, field operation fuel and repairs, and fixed 
field equipment cost.  A $40 per acre management charge is also charged to the tenant. 
2 Landlord pays 30% of variable costs of fertilization, hauling and drying; 100% of irrigation 






Table 2.7 – Production Cost Share, Rice Ratoon Crop, Fixed Dollar Cash Rental Arrangement 
  Total Rice Ratoon Crop Production Costs 1 
          Total Costs        Tenant Costs2       Landlord Costs3 







Custom fert appl 
Custom haul 
Field labor 
Fuel – field operations 
Fuel – irrigation 
Repairs – equip. 
Repairs – irrg equip. 
Interest oper. cap. 
Fixed cost – equip. 





























































































































1 Prorated costs per acre for a 38% ratoon crop acreage production. 
2 Tenant pays 100% of variable costs of fertilization, hauling and drying; 100% of variable 
costs for irrigation supplies, field labor, field operation fuel and repairs.  Tenant also pays 
100% of irrigation pumping cost. 






Table 2.8 – Production Cost Share, Rice Ratoon Crop, Fixed Price Cash Rental Arrangement 
  Total Rice Ratoon Crop Production Costs 1 
          Total Costs        Tenant Costs2       Landlord Costs3 







Custom fert appl 
Custom haul 
Field labor 
Fuel – field operations 
Fuel – irrigation 
Repairs – equip. 
Repairs – irrg equip. 
Interest oper. cap. 
Fixed cost – equip. 





























































































































1 Prorated costs per acre for a 38% ratoon crop acreage production. 
2 Tenant pays 100% of variable costs of fertilization, hauling and drying; 100% of variable 
costs for irrigation supplies, field labor, field operation fuel and repairs.  Tenant also pays 
100% of irrigation pumping cost. 






Table 2.9 – Production Cost Share, Rice Ratoon Crop, Fixed Yield Cash Rental Arrangement 
  Total Rice Ratoon Crop Production Costs 1 
          Total Costs        Tenant Costs2       Landlord Costs3 







Custom fert appl 
Custom haul 
Field labor 
Fuel – field operations 
Fuel – irrigation 
Repairs – equip. 
Repairs – irrg equip. 
Interest oper. cap. 
Fixed cost – equip. 





























































































































1 Prorated costs per acre for a 38% ratoon crop acreage production. 
2 Tenant pays 100% of variable costs of fertilization, hauling and drying; 100% of variable 
costs for irrigation supplies, field labor, field operation fuel and repairs.  Tenant also pays 
100% of irrigation pumping cost. 






Table 2.10 – Production Cost Share, Rice   Crop, 60/40 Crop Share Rental Arrangement 
  Total Rice Ratoon Crop Production Costs 1 
          Total Costs        Tenant Costs2       Landlord Costs3 







Custom fert appl 
Custom haul 
Field labor 
Fuel – field operations 
Fuel – irrigation 
Repairs – equip. 
Repairs – irrg equip. 
Interest oper. cap. 
Fixed cost – equip. 





























































































































1 Prorated costs per acre for a 38% ratoon crop acreage production. 
2 Tenant pays 60% of variable costs of fertilization, hauling and drying; 100% of variable costs 
for irrigation supplies, field labor, field operation fuel and repairs.  Tenant also pays 10% of 
irrigation pumping cost. 






Table 2.11 – Production Cost Share, Rice Ratoon Crop, 70/30 Crop Share Rental Arrangement 
  Total Rice Ratoon Crop Production Costs 1 
          Total Costs        Tenant Costs2       Landlord Costs3 







Custom fert appl 
Custom haul 
Field labor 
Fuel – field operations 
Fuel – irrigation 
Repairs – equip. 
Repairs – irrg equip. 
Interest oper. cap. 
Fixed cost – equip. 





























































































































1 Prorated costs per acre for a 38% ratoon crop acreage production. 
2 Tenant pays 70% of variable costs of fertilization, hauling and drying; 100% of variable costs 
for irrigation supplies, field labor, field operation fuel and repairs.  Tenant also pays 35% of 
irrigation pumping cost. 









Table 2.12 – Production Cost Share, Rice Ratoon Crop, 80/20 Crop Share Rental Arrangement 
  Total Rice Ratoon Crop Production Costs 1 
          Total Costs        Tenant Costs2       Landlord Costs3 







Custom fert appl 
Custom haul 
Field labor 
Fuel – field operations 
Fuel – irrigation 
Repairs – equip. 
Repairs – irrg equip. 
Interest oper. cap. 
Fixed cost – equip. 





























































































































1 Prorated costs per acre for a 38% ratoon crop acreage production. 
2 Tenant pays 80% of variable costs of fertilization, hauling and drying; 100% of variable costs 
for irrigation supplies, field labor, field operation fuel and repairs.  Tenant also pays 55% of 
irrigation pumping cost. 






 Flexible crop land rental rates utilize some specified yield and/or market price trigger 
which, if enacted, allow the rental rate to adjust to a lower specified value.  For each base rice 
rental arrangement evaluated in this study, three flexible rental rate triggers were specified:  (a.) 
a price trigger, (b.) a yield trigger, and (c.) a price and yield trigger.  These lower price and yield 
triggers were set at a value equal to the expected mean price or yield minus one standard 
deviation.  For the yield trigger, a simulated expected mean of 68.30 cwt. /acre with a standard 
deviation of 1.95 cwt. /acre resulted in a yield trigger of 66.35 cwt. /acre.  If the actual simulated 
yield in a given year was less than 66.35 cwt. /acre, the flexible rent would adjust to a lower 
specified rate.  For the price trigger, a simulated expected U.S. long grain market price of 
$11.94/cwt. with a standard deviation of $1.51/cwt. resulted in a market price trigger of 
$10.42/cwt for the trended price data scenario (Scenario A).  
 For the untrended price data scenario (Scenario B), a simulated mean price of 
$11.69/cwt. with a standard deviation of $2.45/cwt. resulted in a market price trigger of 
$9.24/cwt.  If the market price of U.S. long grain rice fell below these trigger levels, the flexible 
rent would adjust to a lower specified rate.  These lower specified rental rates were assumed to 
be 10% below the base rate.  
 Base rental rates, yield and price triggers, and flexible adjusted rental rates are shown in 
Tables 2.13 and 2.14 for the two market price scenarios evaluated in this study. It is important to 
notice that the two scenarios have the same base land rental rate per acre, the same flexible rent 
after the triggered adjustment, the same yield trigger values, but they have different price trigger 










Base Land Rental 
Rate per Acre 
Yield Trigger 
and/or  
Price Trigger 1,2 

















































































1 Yield and price trigger is specified as equal to one standard deviation below the simulated 
mean of parish rice yield and U.S. long grain rice price. 
2 Three alternative flexible rental arrangements were evaluated for each base rental 
arrangement:  (a.) price trigger, (b.) yield trigger and (c.) price and yield trigger. 
3 Rent adjustment is equal to a 10% reduction in base rental rate. 
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Base Land Rental 
Rate per Acre 
Yield Trigger 
and/or  
Price Trigger 1,2 

















































































1 Yield and price trigger is specified as equal to one standard deviation below the simulated 
means of parish rice yield and U.S. long grain rice price.  
2 Three alternative flexible rental arrangements were evaluated for each base rental 
arrangement:  (a.) price trigger, (b.) yield trigger and (c.) price and yield trigger. 
3 Rent adjustment is equal to a 10% reduction in base rental rate. 
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CHAPTER 3.  RICE RENTAL ARRANGMENT EVALUATION MODEL 
 
 Chapter 2 dealt with the issue of defining and specifying an equitable rice crop rental 
arrangement between a landlord and a tenant in the sense that the production costs need to be 
divided in the same proportions as the proportions of the rental arrangement. This chapter presents 
the Rice Rental Arrangement Evaluation model, which is a model that evaluates net returns from 
rice production for alternative cash and share rental arrangements above total rice production costs 
over a range of simulated rice market prices, crop yields, and input prices, with participation in the 
Price Loss Coverage (PLC) Program option of the 2014 farm bill. 
      3.1 Farm Program Participation 
    One of the major changes introduced in the 2014 Agricultural Act of 2014 is the 
repeal of Direct and Countercyclical Payments (DCP) and the Average Crop Revenue Election 
(ACRE) and their replacement by the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and the Agricultural Risk 
Coverage County or Individual.    
The PLC, as its name indicates, is a price support program that is paid  to farmers 
whenever the reference price for certain commodities covered by the program is greater than the 
effective price. The effective price refers to the higher of the market year average (MYA) and the 
loan rate (LR).    
                            Payment = .85 * base acre * payment yield * payment rate  
The payment yield can be the same under the previous bill or updated to 90% the farm yield 
from 2008 to 2012. 
The Agricultural Risk Coverage is a revenue support program.  Eligible farmers receive 
payments whenever the actual payment is less than the guarantee revenue. The guarantee 
revenue is equal to 86% of the five year Olympic average of the parish yield times the five year 
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Olympic average of the market year average (MYA). The difference between the actual revenue 
and the guarantee is the payment rate. 
                   ARC- Parish = 85% x*Payment rate * Base acres 
Since rice in this region relies heavily on irrigation, there is little variation expected in 
yield from to year. Therefore, decision maker are likely to choose the PLC program over the 
ARC- Parish program.  
3.2 Tenant and Landlord Net Return Specification 
The tenant net return above specified costs in dollar per acre is equal to his/her share of 
the revenue and the PLC payment less the cost in dollar per acre of the first crop and ratoon crop 
costs. 
GRWNR =  [ (PR * YD * GRR) + (PLC * PGYD * PLTRatio * GRPG) ] 
- [ (Pn * N * GRn) + (Pp * P * GRp) + (Pk * K * GRk)  
+ (Pf * Ffld * GRf) + (Pf * Firg * GRi) + (Pd * YD * GRd)  
+ (OVC * GRo) + (MFC * GRmfc) + (IFC * GRifc) + CR + MGT ]  
– PRC * [ (Pn * NR * GRn) + (Pf * FRfld * GRf)+ (Pf * FRirg * GRi)  
+ (OVCR * GRo) ]                      (3.1) 
where GRWNR = grower net returns above specified costs in dollars per acre, PR = market price 
of rough rice in dollars per cwt., YD = rough rice yield in cwt. per acre, GRR = grower’s share of 
market revenue, PLC = government farm program (Price Loss Coverage Program) payment in 
dollars per program yield, PGYD = rough rice program yield in cwt. per acre, PLTRatio = 
planting ratio of paid program acres to planted acres, GRPG = grower’s share of program 
payments, Pn = price of nitrogen fertilizer in dollars per pound of active ingredient, N = quantity 
of nitrogen fertilizer applied in pounds of active ingredient per acre, GRn = grower’s share of 
41 
 
nitrogen fertilizer cost, Pp = price of phosphorus fertilizer in dollars per pound of active 
ingredient, P = quantity of phosphorus fertilizer applied in pounds of active ingredient per acre, 
GRp = grower’s share of phosphorus fertilizer cost, Pk = price of potassium fertilizer in dollars 
per pound of active ingredient, K = quantity of potassium fertilizer applied in pounds of active 
ingredient per acre, GR = grower’s share of potassium fertilizer cost, Pf = price of diesel fuel in 
dollars per gallon, Ffld = quantity of diesel fuel used for field operations in gallons per acre, GRf 
= grower’s share of field operation fuel cost, Firg = quantity of diesel fuel used for irrigation in 
gallons per acre, GRi = grower’s share of irrigation cost, Pd = cost of drying in dollars per cwt., 
GRd = grower’s share of drying cost, OVC = other variable costs in dollars per acre, GRo = 
grower’s share of other variable costs, MFC = machinery fixed costs in dollars per acre, GRmfc = 
grower’s share of machinery fixed costs, IFC = irrigation fixed costs in dollars per acre, GRifc = 
grower’s share of irrigation fixed costs, CR = cash rent in dollars per acre, MGT = management 
charge in dollars per acre, PRC = percent of rice crop ratooned, NR = quantity of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied to ratoon crop in pounds of active ingredient per acre, FRfld = quantity of diesel 
fuel used for field operations on ratoon crop in gallons per acre, FRirg = quantity of diesel fuel 
used for irrigation of ratoon crop in gallons per acre, OVCR = other variable costs for ratoon crop. 
 
The landlord net return above specified costs in dollar per acre is equal to his/her share of 
the revenue and the PLC payment less the cost in dollar per acre of the first crop and ratoon crop. 
LLDNR =  [ (PR * YD * LRR) + (PLC * PGYD * PLTRatio * LRPG) + CR ] 
- [ (Pn * N * LRn) + (Pp * P * LRp) + (Pk * K * LRk)  
+ (Pf * Ffld * LRf) + (Pf * Firg * LRi) + (Pd * YD * LRd)  
+ (OVC * LRo) + (MFC * LRmfc) + (IFC * LRifc) + PTX ] 
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 – PRC * [ (Pn * NR * LRn) + (Pf * FRfld * LRf)+ (Pf * FRirg * LRi)  
+ (OVCR * LRo) ]                      (3.2) 
where LLDNR = landlord net returns above specified costs in dollars per acre, LRR = landlord’s 
share of market revenue, LRPG = landlord’s share of farm program payments, LRn = landlord’s 
share of nitrogen fertilizer cost, LRp = landlord’s share of phosphorus fertilizer cost, LRk = 
landlord’s share of potassium fertilizer cost, LRf = landlord’s share of field operation fuel cost, Ri 
= landlord’s share of irrigation fuel cost, LRd = landlord’s share of drying cost, LRo = landord’s 
share of other variable costs, LRmfc = landord’s share of machinery fixed costs, LRifc = landlord’s 
share of irrigation fixed costs, PTX = property taxes in dollars per acre, and all other variables 
are as defined in equation 31. 
PLC =  if (PR < RP) then PLC = RP – PR, else PLC = 0  (3.3)          
where RP = rough rice reference price under the Price Loss Coverage Program of $14/cwt. 
3.3 Net Return Simulation 
 Net returns to the tenant and landlord were simulated over a range of random rice yields, 
market prices and input prices.  Random values for four input prices were simulated in this 
analysis.  These random input price values included diesel fuel (Pf), nitrogen fertilizer (Pn), 
phosphorus fertilizer (Pp) and potassium fertilizer (Pk).  Published prices for these input price 
values for the years 2004-2013 were taken from crop enterprise budgets published by the 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness at the Louisiana State University 
Agricultural Center and were used as the historical data on which the simulation of random input 
prices were performed.  No significant trend was present in the data, therefore the historical 
values were not detrended prior to the simulation process.  The simulation computer package 
Simetar (Richardson, et al., 2008) was utilized to simulate the four random input prices.  
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Simulation means for the randomly generated input prices were set at their previous five-year 
averages of $3.48/gallon for diesel fuel, $0.56/pound for nitrogen, $0.65/pound for phosphorus 
and $0.47/pound for potassium. 
 Random yields were simulated using historical yield data for Acadia Parish, Louisiana.  
The previous ten years of rough rice yield history from 2004-2013 were utilized in generating 
random rice yields used in the analysis.  Yields were detrended and the simulation mean was 
specified as equal to the previous three-year average yield of 6,840 pounds of rough rice per 
acre.  This yield does include a proportion of production from ratoon crop acreage.  As a result, 
the production costs simulated in the analysis included a proportional share of ratoon crop 
production costs equal to the average percent of rice acres ratoon cropped in Acadia Parish over 
the past few years. 
 Two different simulations of rough rice market prices were included in the analysis.  
Over the previous ten-year period (2004-2013), there was a significant trend factor in the U.S. 
long grain market price history.  This significant trend factor occurred as a result of the particular 
period of time chosen.  Rough rice market prices were relatively low in the early years of the 
period and were relatively high during the later years of the period, thereby resulting in a 
significant trend.  As a result, one rough rice market price simulation utilized detrended price 
data, to represent a period of relatively lower market price variation.  A second rough rice market 
price simulation utilized untrended price data, to represent a period of relatively greater market 
price variation.  In both cases, the mean of the U.S. long grain rice market price simulation was 
set equal to the previous ten-year average price of $11.85 per cwt.   
 The U.S. long grain rice price was used to simulate the Price Loss Coverage farm 
program, as any program payments are triggered based on the U.S. market price.  Market sales of 
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rough rice in this analysis were based on simulated values of Louisiana average rice market 
prices.  Louisiana market prices were simulated by first estimating the price deviations between 
the U.S. long grain and Louisiana average rice market prices.  These price deviations were then 
randomly simulated and the simulated price deviation added to the simulated U.S. long grain 





















CHAPTER 4. RICE RENTAL ARRANGEMENT EVALUATION RESULTS 
This chapter presents and analyses the results of the  two scenarios presented in the 
previous chapter (prices detrended and prices not detrended) for six rental arrangements (each 
with four options) using three different risk management measures: the Mean Variance, the 
Value at Risk (VaR), and the Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF).  
4.1 Mean Variance Analysis 
The Mean- Variance analysis focuses on two parameters of the distribution: the mean and 
the variance of the variable at stake. The mean is preferably large and the variance is preferably 
small. It is particularly suitable for outcomes with normal distribution, but it can be used in other 
parametric or nonparametric distributions. In the Mean-Variance risk analysis, an alternative A is 
preferred to an alternative B if it has a smaller variance and its mean is at least equal to the mean 
of B. If an alternative has a smaller variance but the other alternative has a larger mean, the risk 
measure has no discriminatory power. 
The results of table 4.1 and figure 4.1 indicates that, for the most part, arrangements 
based on sharing a certain proportion of the revenue (80/20, 70/30, 60/40) in scenario A are 
preferred to those that are based on fixed dollar, price, or yield. Every single option in the first 
category dominates every single option in the second category except of two options 4A and 4B. 
The same observation applies to scenario B.  
 Applying the Mean-Value rule to the tenant’s scenario A shows that every option is 
dominated by at least another except of the following options: 60/40 Price trigger (4C), 60/40 
Price-Yield trigger (4D), 70/30 Yield – Price trigger, and 80/20 Yield –Price trigger. For the 




Table 4.1 – Tenant Net Returns Above Total Production Costs – Scenario A 










 Neg. Returns 
Arrangement ($/acre) ($/acre) (%) (%) 
 
(1-A) Fixed dollar – base1 
(1-B) Fixed dollar – yld trigger1 
(1-C) Fixed dollar – prc trigger1 
(1-D) Fixed dollar – yld/prc trigger1 
 
(2-A) Fixed price – base2 
(2-B) Fixed price – yld trigger2 
(2-C) Fixed price – prc trigger2 
(2-D) Fixed price – yld/prc trigger2 
 
(3-A) Fixed yield – base3 
(3-B) Fixed yield – yld trigger3 
(3-C) Fixed yield – prc trigger3 
(3-D) Fixed yield – yld/prc trigger3 
 
(4-A) 60/40 – base4 
(4-B) 60/40 – yld trigger4 
(4-C) 60/40 – prc trigger4 
(4-D) 60/40 – yld/prc trigger4 
 
(5-A) 70/30 – base5 
(5-B) 70/30 – yld trigger5 
(5-C) 70/30 – prc trigger5 
(5-D) 70/30 – yld/prc trigger5 
 
(6-A) 80/20 – base6 
(6-B) 80/20 – yld trigger6 
(6-C) 80/20 – prc trigger6 


























































































































1 Base cash rent = $80 per acre, or $60 per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre. 2 Base cash rent = $1.20 per cwt, or $0.90 per cwt if market price < $10.42/cwt 
and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 3 Base cash rent = value of 6.8 cwt/acre, or 5.1 cwt/acre if 
market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 4 Base share rent = 40% of crop 
proceeds, or 30% per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 
5 Base share rent = 30% of crop proceeds, or 23% if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre. 6 Base share rent = 20% of crop proceeds, or 15% if market price < $10.42/cwt 






Table 4.2 – Tenant Net Returns Above Total Production Costs – Scenario B 










 Neg. Returns 
Arrangement ($/acre) ($/acre) (%) (%) 
 
(1-A) Fixed dollar – base1 
(1-B) Fixed dollar – yld trigger1 
(1-C) Fixed dollar – prc trigger1 
(1-D) Fixed dollar – yld/prc trigger1 
 
(2-A) Fixed price – base2 
(2-B) Fixed price – yld trigger2 
(2-C) Fixed price  – prc trigger2 
(2-D) Fixed price – yld/prc trigger2 
 
(3-A) Fixed yield – base3 
(3-B) Fixed yield – yld trigger3 
(3-C) Fixed yield – prc trigger3 
(3-D) Fixed yield – yld/prc trigger3 
 
(4-A) 60/40 – base4 
(4-B) 60/40 – yld trigger4 
(4-C) 60/40 – prc trigger4 
(4-D) 60/40 – yld/prc trigger4 
 
(5-A) 70/30 – base5 
(5-B) 70/30 – yld trigger5 
(5-C) 70/30 – prc trigger5 
(5-D) 70/30 – yld/prc trigger5 
 
(6-A) 80/20 – base6 
(6-B) 80/20 – yld trigger6 
(6-C) 80/20 – prc trigger6 


























































































































1 Base cash rent = $80 per acre, or $60 per acre if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.2 Base cash rent = $1.20 per cwt, or $0.90 per cwt if market price < $9.24/cwt 
and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.3 Base cash rent = value of 6.8 cwt/acre, or 5.1 cwt/acre if 
market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.4 Base share rent = 40% of crop 
proceeds, or 30% per acre if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 
5 Base share rent = 30% of crop proceeds, or 23% if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.6 Base share rent = 20% of crop proceeds, or 15% if market price < $9.24/cwt 






Figure 4.1- Mean Variance Analysis Results, Grower Net returns, 
        Scenario A – Prev. 3-yr yield, Price Detrended. 
 
 
Figure 4.2- Mean Variance Analysis Results, Grower Net returns, 




For the landlord’s scenario A, Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3 show that the efficient set is 
composed of the following arrangements: Fixed Dollar- Base (1A), Fixed Price-Base (2A), and 
Fixed Yield–Base (3A) and for scenario B it is made up  of the following arrangements: Fixed 
Price-Base (1A), and Fixed Yield-Base (2A). (Table 4.5 and Figure 4.4 ).  Tables 4.5- 4.8 
presents the mean and standard deviation distribution between the two parties.
 
 
Figure 4.3- Mean Variance Analysis Results, Landlord Net returns, 
        Scenario A – Prev. 3-yr yield, Price Detrended. 
 
 
Figure 4.4- Mean Variance Analysis Results, Landl Net returns, 




Table 4.3 – Landlord Net Returns Above Total Production Costs – Scenario A 











 Neg. Returns 
($/acre) ($/acre) (%) (%) 
 
(1-A) Fixed dollar – base1 
(1-B) Fixed dollar – yld trigger1 
(1-C) Fixed dollar – prc trigger1 
(1-D) Fixed dollar – yld/prc trigger1 
 
(2-A) Fixed price – base2 
(2-B) Fixed price – yld trigger2 
(2-C) Fixed price  – prc trigger2 
(2-D) Fixed price – yld/prc trigger2 
 
(3-A) Fixed yield – base3 
(3-B) Fixed yield – yld trigger3 
(3-C) Fixed yield – prc trigger3 
(3-D) Fixed yield – yld/prc trigger3 
 
(4-A) 60/40 – base4 
(4-B) 60/40 – yld trigger4 
(4-C) 60/40 – prc trigger4 
(4-D) 60/40 – yld/prc trigger4 
 
(5-A) 70/30 – base5 
(5-B) 70/30 – yld trigger5 
(5-C) 70/30 – prc trigger5 
(5-D) 70/30 – yld/prc trigger5 
 
(6-A) 80/20 – base6 
(6-B) 80/20 – yld trigger6 
(6-C) 80/20 – prc trigger6 



























































































































1 Base cash rent = $80 per acre, or $60 per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.2 Base cash rent = $1.20 per cwt, or $0.90 per cwt if market price < $10.42/cwt 
and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.3 Base cash rent = value of 6.8 cwt/acre, or 5.1 cwt/acre if market 
price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.4 Base share rent = 40% of crop proceeds, or 
30% per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.5 Base share rent = 
30% of crop proceeds, or 23% if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 






Table 4.4 – Landlord Net Returns Above Total Production Costs – Scenario B 












 Neg. Returns 
($/acre) ($/acre) (%) (%) 
 
(1-A) Fixed dollar – base1 
(1-B) Fixed dollar – yld trigger1 
(1-C) Fixed dollar – prc trigger1 
(1-D) Fixed dollar – yld/prc trigger1 
 
(2-A) Fixed price – base2 
(2-B) Fixed price – yld trigger2 
(2-C) Fixed price  – prc trigger2 
(2-D) Fixed price – yld/prc trigger2 
 
(3-A) Fixed yield – base3 
(3-B) Fixed yield – yld trigger3 
(3-C) Fixed yield – prc trigger3 
(3-D) Fixed yield – yld/prc trigger3 
 
(4-A) 60/40 – base4 
(4-B) 60/40 – yld trigger4 
(4-C) 60/40 – prc trigger4 
(4-D) 60/40 – yld/prc trigger4 
 
(5-A) 70/30 – base5 
(5-B) 70/30 – yld trigger5 
(5-C) 70/30 – prc trigger5 
(5-D) 70/30 – yld/prc trigger5 
 
(6-A) 80/20 – base6 
(6-B) 80/20 – yld trigger6 
(6-C) 80/20 – prc trigger6 


























































































































1 Base cash rent = $80 per acre, or $60 per acre if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 
cwt/acre.2 Base cash rent = $1.20 per cwt, or $0.90 per cwt if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or 
yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.3 Base cash rent = value of 6.8 cwt/acre, or 5.1 cwt/acre if market price < 
$9.24/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.4 Base share rent = 40% of crop proceeds, or 30% per 
acre if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.5 Base share rent = 30% of crop 
proceeds, or 23% if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.6 Base share rent = 






Table 4.5 – Mean Net Returns Above Total Production Costs – Scenario A 
  Distribution of Mean Net Returns 
Rice Rental Tenant Landlord 
Arrangement ($/acre) (%) ($/acre) (%) 
 
(1-A) Fixed dollar – base1 
(1-B) Fixed dollar – yld trigger1 
(1-C) Fixed dollar – prc trigger1 
(1-D) Fixed dollar – yld/prc trigger1 
 
(2-A) Fixed price – base2 
(2-B) Fixed price – yld trigger2 
(2-C) Fixed price  – prc trigger2 
(2-D) Fixed price – yld/prc trigger2 
 
(3-A) Fixed yield – base3 
(3-B) Fixed yield – yld trigger3 
(3-C) Fixed yield – prc trigger3 
(3-D) Fixed yield – yld/prc trigger3 
 
(4-A) 60/40 – base4 
(4-B) 60/40 – yld trigger4 
(4-C) 60/40 – prc trigger4 
(4-D) 60/40 – yld/prc trigger4 
 
(5-A) 70/30 – base5 
(5-B) 70/30 – yld trigger5 
(5-C) 70/30 – prc trigger5 
(5-D) 70/30 – yld/prc trigger5 
 
(6-A) 80/20 – base6 
(6-B) 80/20 – yld trigger6 
(6-C) 80/20 – prc trigger6 


























































































































1 Base cash rent = $80 per acre, or $60 per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.2 Base cash rent = $1.20 per cwt, or $0.90 per cwt if market price < $10.42/cwt 
and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.3 Base cash rent = value of 6.8 cwt/acre, or 5.1 cwt/acre if 
market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.4 Base share rent = 40% of crop 
proceeds, or 30% per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 
5 Base share rent = 30% of crop proceeds, or 23% if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.6 Base share rent = 20% of crop proceeds, or 15% if market price < $10.42/cwt 










































Table 4.6 – Standard Deviation of Net Returns Above Total Production Costs – Scenario A 
  Distribution of Stand Deviation of Net Returns 
Rice Rental Tenant Landlord 
Arrangement ($/acre) (%) ($/acre) (%) 
 
(1-A) Fixed dollar – base1 
(1-B) Fixed dollar – yld trigger1 
(1-C) Fixed dollar – prc trigger1 
(1-D) Fixed dollar – yld/prc trigger1 
 
(2-A) Fixed price – base2 
(2-B) Fixed price – yld trigger2 
(2-C) Fixed price  – prc trigger2 
(2-D) Fixed price – yld/prc trigger2 
 
(3-A) Fixed yield – base3 
(3-B) Fixed yield – yld trigger3 
(3-C) Fixed yield – prc trigger3 
(3-D) Fixed yield – yld/prc trigger3 
 
(4-A) 60/40 – base4 
(4-B) 60/40 – yld trigger4 
(4-C) 60/40 – prc trigger4 
(4-D) 60/40 – yld/prc trigger4 
 
(5-A) 70/30 – base5 
(5-B) 70/30 – yld trigger5 
(5-C) 70/30 – prc trigger5 
(5-D) 70/30 – yld/prc trigger5 
 
(6-A) 80/20 – base6 
(6-B) 80/20 – yld trigger6 
(6-C) 80/20 – prc trigger6 



























































































































1 Base cash rent = $80 per acre, or $60 per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.2 Base cash rent = $1.20 per cwt, or $0.90 per cwt if market price < $10.42/cwt 
and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.3 Base cash rent = value of 6.8 cwt/acre, or 5.1 cwt/acre if 
market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.4 Base share rent = 40% of crop 
proceeds, or 30% per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 
5 Base share rent = 30% of crop proceeds, or 23% if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.6 Base share rent = 20% of crop proceeds, or 15% if market price < $10.42/cwt 





Table 4.7 – Mean Net Returns Above Total Production Costs – Scenario B 
  Distribution of Mean Net Returns 
Rice Rental Tenant Landlord 
Arrangement ($/acre) (%) ($/acre) (%) 
 
(1-A) Fixed dollar – base1 
(1-B) Fixed dollar – yld trigger1 
(1-C) Fixed dollar – prc trigger1 
(1-D) Fixed dollar – yld/prc trigger1 
 
(2-A) Fixed price – base2 
(2-B) Fixed price – yld trigger2 
(2-C) Fixed price  – prc trigger2 
(2-D) Fixed price – yld/prc trigger2 
 
(3-A) Fixed yield – base3 
(3-B) Fixed yield – yld trigger3 
(3-C) Fixed yield – prc trigger3 
(3-D) Fixed yield – yld/prc trigger3 
 
(4-A) 60/40 – base4 
(4-B) 60/40 – yld trigger4 
(4-C) 60/40 – prc trigger4 
(4-D) 60/40 – yld/prc trigger4 
 
(5-A) 70/30 – base5 
(5-B) 70/30 – yld trigger5 
(5-C) 70/30 – prc trigger5 
(5-D) 70/30 – yld/prc trigger5 
 
(6-A) 80/20 – base6 
(6-B) 80/20 – yld trigger6 
(6-C) 80/20 – prc trigger6 


























































































































1 Base cash rent = $80 per acre, or $60 per acre if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.2 Base cash rent = $1.20 per cwt, or $0.90 per cwt if market price < $9.24/cwt 
and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.3 Base cash rent = value of 6.8 cwt/acre, or 5.1 cwt/acre if 
market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.4 Base share rent = 40% of crop 
proceeds, or 30% per acre if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 
5 Base share rent = 30% of crop proceeds, or 23% if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.6 Base share rent = 20% of crop proceeds, or 15% if market price < $9.24/cwt 




Table 4.8 – Standard Deviation of Net Returns Above Total Production Costs – Scenario B 
  Distribution of Stand Deviation of Net Returns 
Rice Rental Tenant Landlord 
Arrangement ($/acre) (%) ($/acre) (%) 
 
(1-A) Fixed dollar – base1 
(1-B) Fixed dollar – yld trigger1 
(1-C) Fixed dollar – prc trigger1 
(1-D) Fixed dollar – yld/prc trigger1 
 
(2-A) Fixed price – base2 
(2-B) Fixed price – yld trigger2 
(2-C) Fixed price  – prc trigger2 
(2-D) Fixed price – yld/prc trigger2 
 
(3-A) Fixed yield – base3 
(3-B) Fixed yield – yld trigger3 
(3-C) Fixed yield – prc trigger3 
(3-D) Fixed yield – yld/prc trigger3 
 
(4-A) 60/40 – base4 
(4-B) 60/40 – yld trigger4 
(4-C) 60/40 – prc trigger4 
(4-D) 60/40 – yld/prc trigger4 
 
(5-A) 70/30 – base5 
(5-B) 70/30 – yld trigger5 
(5-C) 70/30 – prc trigger5 
(5-D) 70/30 – yld/prc trigger5 
 
(6-A) 80/20 – base6 
(6-B) 80/20 – yld trigger6 
(6-C) 80/20 – prc trigger6 


























































































































1 Base cash rent = $80 per acre, or $60 per acre if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.2 Base cash rent = $1.20 per cwt, or $0.90 per cwt if market price < $9.24/cwt 
and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.3 Base cash rent = value of 6.8 cwt/acre, or 5.1 cwt/acre if 
market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.4 Base share rent = 40% of crop 
proceeds, or 30% per acre if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 
5 Base share rent = 30% of crop proceeds, or 23% if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.6 Base share rent = 20% of crop proceeds, or 15% if market price < $9.24/cwt 




Unlike the Mean-Value approach, which considers the mean and standard deviation jointly, here 
the parameters are considered separately. It may be a useful tool if the Mean-Value fails to 
discriminate between different alternatives. 
4.2 Value at Risk Analysis  
Another way of ranking alternative rental arrangements is to compare their Value-at Risk 
(VaR) at a certain percentile: ten percent, twenty five percent, fifty percent or any other 
percentage. In this context, the value at risk is simply the value at which the net return above 
specific costs is expected to be below ten percent of the time and above it ninety percent of the 
time. The higher the value at risk of the alternative the less risky it is. The results of this risk 
measure are exposed in table 4.9 and table 4.10 for scenario A and B respectively.  In general, 
for the tenant the rental arrangement based on fixed dollar, price or yield are riskier than the 
80/20, 70/30, and 60/40 arrangement, and for the landlord the 80/20, 70/30, and 60/40 
arrangements are riskier than the arrangement based on fixed dollar, price or yield.  
 For the tenant’s scenario A, the best option is the 80/20 Yield /Price trigger (6D) with a 
value that is equal to $57/acre, and the worst is Fixed Price –Base (2A) with a value equal to $-
4/acre.  For the landlord’s scenario A, the best options are Fixed Dollar- Base (1A) and Fixed 
Dollar-Yield trigger (1B)  with a value equal to $41/acre , and the worst is the 60/40 Yield /Price 
trigger (4D) with a value equal to -$48/acre. For the tenant’ scenario B, the best and worst 
arrangement are the same as those of the tenant’s scenario A, but the values are different: 







Table 4.9 – Value at Risk Measures for 10% Level - Scenario A 
  Value at Risk 10% 
Rice Rental Tenant Landlord 
Arrangement ($/acre) ($/acre) 
 
(1-A) Fixed dollar – base1 
(1-B) Fixed dollar – yld trigger1 
(1-C) Fixed dollar – prc trigger1 
(1-D) Fixed dollar – yld/prc trigger1 
 
(2-A) Fixed price – base2 
(2-B) Fixed price – yld trigger2 
(2-C) Fixed price  – prc trigger2 
(2-D) Fixed price – yld/prc trigger2 
 
(3-A) Fixed yield – base3 
(3-B) Fixed yield – yld trigger3 
(3-C) Fixed yield – prc trigger3 
 (3-D) Fixed yield – yld/prc trigger3 
 
 
(4-A) 60/40 – base4 
(4-B) 60/40 – yld trigger4 
(4-C) 60/40 – prc trigger4 
(4-D) 60/40 – yld/prc trigger4 
 
(5-A) 70/30 – base5 
(5-B) 70/30 – yld trigger5 
(5-C) 70/30 – prc trigger5 
(5-D) 70/30 – yld/prc trigger5 
 
(6-A) 80/20 – base6 
(6-B) 80/20 – yld trigger6 
(6-C) 80/20 – prc trigger6 
















                    
 




                    









































1 Base cash rent = $80 per acre, or $60 per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.2 Base cash rent = $1.20 per cwt, or $0.90 per cwt if market price < $10.42/cwt 
and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.3 Base cash rent = value of 6.8 cwt/acre, or 5.1 cwt/acre if 
market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.4 Base share rent = 40% of crop 
proceeds, or 30% per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 
5 Base share rent = 30% of crop proceeds, or 23% if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.6 Base share rent = 20% of crop proceeds, or 15% if market price < $10.42/cwt 















Table 4.10 – Value at Risk Measures for 10% Level - Scenario B 
  Value at Risk 10% 
Rice Rental Tenant Landlord 
Arrangement ($/acre) ($/acre) 
 
(1-A) Fixed dollar – base1 
(1-B) Fixed dollar – yld trigger1 
(1-C) Fixed dollar – prc trigger1 
(1-D) Fixed dollar – yld/prc trigger1 
 
(2-A) Fixed price – base2 
(2-B) Fixed price – yld trigger2 
(2-C) Fixed price  – prc trigger2 
(2-D) Fixed price – yld/prc trigger2 
 
(3-A) Fixed yield – base3 
(3-B) Fixed yield – yld trigger3 
(3-C) Fixed yield – prc trigger3 
(3-D) Fixed yield – yld/prc trigger3 
 
(4-A) 60/40 – base4 
(4-B) 60/40 – yld trigger4 
(4-C) 60/40 – prc trigger4 
(4-D) 60/40 – yld/prc trigger4 
 
(5-A) 70/30 – base5 
(5-B) 70/30 – yld trigger5 
(5-C) 70/30 – prc trigger5 
(5-D) 70/30 – yld/prc trigger5 
 
(6-A) 80/20 – base6 
(6-B) 80/20 – yld trigger6 
(6-C) 80/20 – prc trigger6 






























































1 Base cash rent = $80 per acre, or $60 per acre if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.2 Base cash rent = $1.20 per cwt, or $0.90 per cwt if market price < $9.24/cwt 
and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.3 Base cash rent = value of 6.8 cwt/acre, or 5.1 cwt/acre if 
market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre.4 Base share rent = 40% of crop 
proceeds, or 30% per acre if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 
5 Base share rent = 30% of crop proceeds, or 23% if market price < $9.24/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre.6 Base share rent = 20% of crop proceeds, or 15% if market price < $9.24/cwt 




Also, the landlord scenario B’s best and worst arrangements are the same as those of the 
landlord’s scenario A, but the value of the worst is different: -$58/acre.  
4.3 SERF Analysis 
 The last risk management measure used in this study is the Stochastic Efficiency with 
Respect to a Function (SERF). It is a type of stochastic dominance that uses certainty equivalence 
to rank risky alternatives. Here, the alternatives are twenty four rental arrangements in each of the 
two scenarios: A and B.  The absolute risk aversion coefficient range is from zero to 0.06. The 
mean of the means of all the alternatives is $50.1. The tenant’s largest mean is $97 (6-D scenario 
A and B), its smallest mean is $56 (3-A scenario A), the landlord highest mean is $45/acre (3-A 
scenario A), and its lowest mean is $1/acre (6-D scenario A).    
The first observation related to SERF is that the price, yield trigger, and the base option 
curves are identical for the six types of rental arrangements reducing the alternatives to six instead 
of twenty four, in each scenario, in the other risk management approaches. The second observation 
is about the graphs of the two scenarios. The curves of scenario A are flatter than those of scenario. 
This is due to the fact that in scenario A the output prices are detrended and in scenario B they are 
not. Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show that the detrending of these price decreases the standard 
deviation of every rental arrangement in scenario B except of one (4- D scenario B), which makes 
every alternative in scenario B riskier than its counterpart in scenario A. Consequently, a decision 
maker, with a certain absolute risk aversion, confronted with the same alternative in both scenarios 
will assign a lower certainty equivalent to the riskier rental arrangement in scenario B. 
  Figure 4.5 and 4.6 show that tenants with absolute risk aversion between zero and 0.06 
would prefer the 80/20 share over the other alternatives in both scenarios. The 70/30 share is 
preferred to the 60/40 share. The 60/40 share is preferred to the rest of the alternatives. For the 
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tenant, scenario A and B are almost the same but  the curves steepness in scenario B decline more 
rapidly than those of scenario A as absolute risk aversion increases.  
Figure 4.7 show that landlords with absolute risk aversion between zero and 0.025 prefer 
the Fixed Yield to the other alternatives. The landlords whose absolute risk aversion is between 
0.025 and 0.06 prefer the Fixed Price arrangement to the other alternatives. These two arrangement 
are preferred to the Fixed Dollar which is preferred to the 60/40 share, the 60/40 is preferred to the 
70/30 which is preferred to the 80/20 share. 
Figure 4.8 indicate that any rational landlord would prefer the Fixed Dollar arrangement to 
the Fixed Price, Fixed Price to the Fixed Yield, the Fixed Yield to the 60/40 share, the 60/40 share 
to the 70/30share, and the 70/30 share to the 80/20 share.  
These SERF results, like the results of the previous risk measures, demonstrate that share 
rental arrangements shift part of the risk from the tenant to the landlord and the more the share 
proportion in the arrangement is the greater the risk transferred. 
 
Figure 4.5 – SERF Analysis Results, Grower Net Returns, 





Figure 4.6 – SERF Analysis Results, Grower Net Returns, 





Figure 4.7 – SERF Analysis Results, Landlord Net Returns, 





Figure 4.8 – SERF Analysis Results, Landlord Net Returns, 



















CHAPTER 5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was threefold: To review the commodity section of the newly adopted 
Agricultural Act of 2014, to specify the terms of an equitable rice rental arrangement for twenty 
four alternatives, and to use Monte Carlo simulations (Simetar) and three different risk measure 
techniques to rank these alternatives. 
The results of this study indicate that crop share rental arrangements result in higher 
expected net returns for the growers, compared to cash rents, and that rental rate adjustment 
based on current prices and/or yields do mitigate net income risk faced by rice growers.  
 
Taking into consideration all the results of the last objective and retaining only the 
dominant options in all three risk measures one can conclude that the 80/20 arrangement 
(sometimes with particular price or yield trigger) would be preferred by any rational tenant and 
that any rational landlord would choose the Fixed price base as his or her best rice rental 
arrangement choice. 
 
This study was conducted under the assumption that rice producers in the United State 
Delta region to choose the PLC option over the ARC (whether county or individual). Therefore 
only the PLC payment was included in the model. This assumption was motivated, among other 
considerations, by the fact that rice irrigation, which is predominant in this region, reduces 
significantly its yield variability which makes the ARC option less likely to be chosen. Further 
studies can prove or disprove this assumption.  
Another limitation of this study is that it does not include the SCO insurance option, 
which many scholars in the field consider as one of the major innovations of this Farm Bill. The 
64 
 
inclusion of such option would complicate the model and is reasonably out of the scope of a 
thesis research. A Ph.D. research may offer the time and resource necessary to conduct it. 
The last word is about who would benefit from this thesis. The obvious answer is: the 
equitable rental arrangement specifications and the results of the three risk measures can be 
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APPENDIX A.  CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS FOR 1-A TENANT PRICES 
DETRENDED 
 Fixed Fixed Fixed    
RAC Dollar Price Yield 60/40 70/30 80/20 
0 59.74 57.78 56.32 59.25 73.08 86.16 
0.0025 56.38 54.55 53.81 58.16 71.61 84.21 
0.005 53.20 51.49 51.42 57.11 70.20 82.35 
0.0075 50.19 48.59 49.13 56.10 68.86 80.58 
0.01 47.31 45.81 46.92 55.13 67.57 78.88 
0.0125 44.54 43.15 44.79 54.19 66.32 77.25 
0.015 41.88 40.58 42.73 53.28 65.13 75.67 
0.0175 39.31 38.10 40.72 52.40 63.97 74.14 
0.02 36.82 35.70 38.77 51.54 62.84 72.65 
0.0225 34.41 33.36 36.86 50.71 61.75 71.20 
0.025 32.06 31.09 35.00 49.89 60.69 69.78 
0.0275 29.77 28.87 33.18 49.10 59.65 68.39 
0.03 27.54 26.71 31.39 48.32 58.64 67.03 
0.0325 25.37 24.60 29.65 47.56 57.65 65.68 
0.035 23.25 22.54 27.93 46.81 56.68 64.36 
0.0375 21.18 20.53 26.25 46.08 55.73 63.05 
0.04 19.16 18.57 24.60 45.36 54.79 61.76 
0.0425 17.20 16.65 22.99 44.66 53.87 60.76 
0.045 15.28 14.78 21.41 43.96 52.97 59.21 
0.0475 13.41 12.95 19.86 43.27 52.07 57.96 
0.05 11.58 11.16 18.35 42.60 51.20 56.72 
0.0525 9.81 9.42 16.86 41.93 50.33 55.49 
0.055 8.08 7.73 15.41 41.27 49.48 54.27 
0.0575 6.40 6.08 14.00 40.62 48.63 53.06 







APPENDIX B.  CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS FOR 1-B TENANT PRICES NOT 
DETRENDED 
 Fixed Fixed Fixed    
RAC Dollar Price Yield 60/40 70/30 80/20 
0 61.89 59.93 60.13 60.54 74.59 87.88 
0.0025 54.92 53.09 55.49 58.11 71.31 83.59 
0.005 48.5 46.79 51.19 55.81 68.21 79.58 
0.0075 42.6 40.98 47.21 53.62 65.31 75.84 
0.01 37.17 35.64 43.51 51.54 62.57 72.36 
0.0125 32.15 30.69 40.07 49.58 60.01 69.11 
0.015 27.49 26.1 36.84 47.72 57.6 66.07 
0.0175 23.15 21.83 33.81 45.95 55.32 63.23 
0.02 19.08 17.82 30.94 44.27 53.18 60.57 
0.0225 15.26 14.05 28.22 42.67 51.16 58.07 
0.025 11.65 10.49 25.63 41.15 49.24 55.71 
0.0275 8.23 7.12 23.15 39.7 47.42 53.47 
0.03 4.97 3.91 20.77 38.32 45.7 51.35 
0.0325 1.86 0.85 18.49 36.99 44.05 49.34 
0.035 -1.11 -2.07 16.28 35.72 42.48 47.42 
0.0375 -3.96 -4.88 14.14 34.51 40.97 45.59 
0.04 -6.71 -7.57 12.08 33.33 39.53 43.84 
0.0425 -9.35 -10.16 10.07 32.21 38.15 42.16 
0.045 -11.89 -12.66 8.11 31.12 36.81 40.54 
0.0475 -14.35 -15.07 6.22 30.08 35.53 38.99 
0.05 -16.73 -17.39 4.37 29.06 34.3 37.5 
0.0525 -19.02 -19.64 2.56 28.08 33.11 36.06 
0.055 -21.25 -21.81 0.8 27.14 31.96 34.67 
0.0575 -23.41 -23.91 -0.91 26.22 30.84 33.33 






APPENDIX C.  CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS FOR 2-A LANDLORD PRICES 
DETRENDED 
 Fixed Fixed Fixed    
RAC Dollar Price Yield 60/40 70/30 80/20 
0 41.26 43.22 44.68 35.51 24.30 11.23 
0.0025 41.26 43.21 44.55 34.80 23.84 10.94 
0.005 41.26 43.20 44.41 34.11 23.37 10.65 
0.0075 41.26 43.20 44.28 33.43 22.91 10.36 
0.01 41.26 43.19 44.15 32.75 22.45 10.07 
0.0125 41.26 43.18 44.02 32.09 21.99 9.78 
0.015 41.26 43.18 43.89 31.43 21.54 9.49 
0.0175 41.26 43.17 43.76 30.78 21.08 9.19 
0.02 41.26 43.16 43.63 30.13 20.08 8.90 
0.0225 41.26 43.16 43.50 29.49 20.18 8.61 
0.025 41.26 43.15 43.38 28.86 19.74 8.31 
0.0275 41.26 43.14 43.25 28.24 19.29 8.02 
0.03 41.26 43.14 43.13 27.62 18.85 7.72 
0.0325 41.26 43.13 43.00 27.00 18.41 7.43 
0.035 41.26 43.12 42.88 26.40 17.97 7.13 
0.0375 41.26 43.12 42.76 25.79 17.53 6.84 
0.04 41.26 43.11 42.64 25.20 17.10 6.54 
0.0425 41.26 43.10 42.52 24.61 16.67 6.25 
0.045 41.26 43.10 42.41 24.02 16.24 5.95 
0.0475 41.26 43.09 42.29 23.44 15.81 5.66 
0.05 41.26 43.09 42.17 22.87 15.39 5.37 
0.0525 41.26 43.08 42.06 22.30 14.96 5.07 
0.055 41.26 43.07 41.95 21.74 14.54 4.78 
0.0575 41.26 43.07 41.84 21.19 14.13 4.49 




APPENDIX D.  CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS FOR 2-B LANDLORD PRICES NOT 
DETRENDED 
 Fixed Fixed Fixed    
RAC Dollar Price Yield 60/40 70/30 80/20 
0.00 41.26 43.22 43.02 36.37 24.95 11.66 
0.00 41.26 43.21 42.66 35.08 24.15 11.22 
0.01 41.26 43.20 42.31 33.82 23.37 10.79 
0.01 41.26 43.20 41.95 32.60 22.60 10.36 
0.01 41.26 43.19 41.60 31.60 21.84 9.93 
0.01 41.26 43.18 41.24 30.25 21.09 9.50 
0.02 41.26 43.18 40.89 29.13 20.36 9.08 
0.02 41.26 43.17 40.53 28.03 19.64 8.66 
0.02 41.26 43.16 40.18 26.96 18.93 8.24 
0.02 41.26 43.16 39.83 25.92 18.24 7.82 
0.03 41.26 43.15 39.48 24.90 17.55 7.41 
0.03 41.26 43.14 39.13 23.91 16.88 7.00 
0.03 41.26 43.14 38.79 22.95 16.21 6.59 
0.03 41.26 43.13 38.45 22.00 15.56 6.19 
0.04 41.26 43.12 38.11 21.07 14.91 5.79 
0.04 41.26 43.12 37.77 20.17 14.28 5.39 
0.04 41.26 43.11 37.44 19.28 13.65 4.99 
0.04 41.26 43.10 37.11 18.41 13.04 4.60 
0.05 41.26 43.10 36.79 17.56 12.43 4.21 
0.05 41.26 43.09 36.46 16.72 11.83 3.82 
0.05 41.26 43.09 36.15 15.90 11.23 3.44 
0.05 41.26 43.08 35.83 15.10 10.65 3.05 
0.06 41.26 43.07 35.52 14.30 10.07 2.67 
0.06 41.26 43.07 35.22 13.52 9.50 2.29 







APPENDIX E. ESTIMATED CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS FOR TENANT NET   






Alternative Risk Aversion Coefficient 
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 
 
(1-A) Fixed dollar – base1 
(1-B) Fixed dollar – yld trigger1 
(1-C) Fixed dollar – prc trigger1 
(1-D) Fixed dollar – yld/prc trigger1 
 
(2-A) Fixed price – base2 
(2-B) Fixed price – yld trigger2 
(2-C) Fixed price – prc trigger2 
(2-D) Fixed price – yld/prc trigger2 
 
(3-A) Fixed yield – base3 
(3-B) Fixed yield – yld trigger3 
(3-C) Fixed yield – prc trigger3 
(3-D) Fixed yield – yld/prc trigger3 
 
(4-A) 60/40 – base4 
(4-B) 60/40 – yld trigger4 
(4-C) 60/40 – prc trigger4 
(4-D) 60/40 – yld/prc trigger4 
 
(5-A) 70/30 – base5 
(5-B) 70/30 – yld trigger5 
(5-C) 70/30 – prc trigger5 
(5-D) 70/30 – yld/prc trigger5 
 
(6-A) 80/20 – base6 
(6-B) 80/20 – yld trigger6 
(6-C) 80/20 – prc trigger6 


























































































































1 Base cash rent = $80 per acre, or $60 per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre. 2 Base cash rent = $1.20 per cwt, or $0.90 per cwt if market price < $10.42/cwt 
and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 3 Base cash rent = value of 6.8 cwt/acre, or 5.1 cwt/acre if 
market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 4 Base share rent = 40% of crop 
proceeds, or 30% per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 
5 Base share rent = 30% of crop proceeds, or 23% if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre. 6 Base share rent = 20% of crop proceeds, or 15% if market price < $10.42/cwt 






APPENDIX F. ESTIMATED CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS FOR TENANT NET   






Alternative Risk Aversion Coefficient 
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 
 
(1-A) Fixed dollar – base1 
(1-B) Fixed dollar – yld trigger1 
(1-C) Fixed dollar – prc trigger1 
(1-D) Fixed dollar – yld/prc trigger1 
 
(2-A) Fixed price – base2 
(2-B) Fixed price – yld trigger2 
(2-C) Fixed price – prc trigger2 
(2-D) Fixed price – yld/prc trigger2 
 
(3-A) Fixed yield – base3 
(3-B) Fixed yield – yld trigger3 
(3-C) Fixed yield – prc trigger3 
(3-D) Fixed yield – yld/prc trigger3 
 
(4-A) 60/40 – base4 
(4-B) 60/40 – yld trigger4 
(4-C) 60/40 – prc trigger4 
(4-D) 60/40 – yld/prc trigger4 
 
(5-A) 70/30 – base5 
(5-B) 70/30 – yld trigger5 
(5-C) 70/30 – prc trigger5 
(5-D) 70/30 – yld/prc trigger5 
 
(6-A) 80/20 – base6 
(6-B) 80/20 – yld trigger6 
(6-C) 80/20 – prc trigger6 


























































































































1 Base cash rent = $80 per acre, or $60 per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre. 2 Base cash rent = $1.20 per cwt, or $0.90 per cwt if market price < $10.42/cwt 
and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 3 Base cash rent = value of 6.8 cwt/acre, or 5.1 cwt/acre if 
market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 4 Base share rent = 40% of crop 
proceeds, or 30% per acre if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 66.35 cwt/acre. 
5 Base share rent = 30% of crop proceeds, or 23% if market price < $10.42/cwt and/or yield < 
66.35 cwt/acre. 6 Base share rent = 20% of crop proceeds, or 15% if market price < $10.42/cwt 
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